Macro-economics, Investments, Law, and Power, with special emphasis on high finance and low humor.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
1320
The REcapitulator believes the S&P will "correct" (readers will note I hate that term...is the market "incorrect" when some participants are long and some are short?) down to this level. We should then see improvement in June/July. If we do not, Greenspan's "33.3% probability", as if such precision was possible, of recession may turn out to be about 60 points too low.
Monday, March 12, 2007
SarbOx
The onerous (and some would say ruinous) and hastily passed Sarbanes-Oxley regulation that has eroded the competitive virtues of listing on the
major American exchanges, and provided a windfall to consulting, legal, and auditing firms, organized resistance is forming.
Although it is difficult to extract exact causalities from the data regarding the propensities for
firms to list here in the U.S., the follwing paper by Luigi Zingales (of the REcapitulators alma mater, the University of Chicago...which everyone knows is the greatest institution for higher
learning this side of Proxima Centauri) does support the simple logic of another one of my professors, the great Robert Aliber, who said:
"If the cost of regulation is greater than the cost of avoidance...the regulation will be avoided"
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/luigi.zingales/research/PSpapers/competitiveness.pdf
And here is a preliminary rejoinder from the political sector:
March 13, 2007
THE US Chamber of Commerce is calling for an end to quarterly earnings
guidance from companies, proposing that auditing firms be allowed to seek
private shareholders, and urging legislation allowing the Securities and
Exchange Commission to ease the burden of Sarbanes-Oxley on foreign
companies.
The recommendations come in a report that is the third high-level effort to
raise alarm about the competitiveness of US capital markets in four months,
as the issue garners attention on both sides of the Atlantic.
In January, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Democratic Senator Chuck
Schumer co-authored a report warning that New York risked losing its
position as the world's financial capital to rivals such as London.
major American exchanges, and provided a windfall to consulting, legal, and auditing firms, organized resistance is forming.
Although it is difficult to extract exact causalities from the data regarding the propensities for
firms to list here in the U.S., the follwing paper by Luigi Zingales (of the REcapitulators alma mater, the University of Chicago...which everyone knows is the greatest institution for higher
learning this side of Proxima Centauri) does support the simple logic of another one of my professors, the great Robert Aliber, who said:
"If the cost of regulation is greater than the cost of avoidance...the regulation will be avoided"
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/luigi.zingales/research/PSpapers/competitiveness.pdf
And here is a preliminary rejoinder from the political sector:
March 13, 2007
THE US Chamber of Commerce is calling for an end to quarterly earnings
guidance from companies, proposing that auditing firms be allowed to seek
private shareholders, and urging legislation allowing the Securities and
Exchange Commission to ease the burden of Sarbanes-Oxley on foreign
companies.
The recommendations come in a report that is the third high-level effort to
raise alarm about the competitiveness of US capital markets in four months,
as the issue garners attention on both sides of the Atlantic.
In January, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Democratic Senator Chuck
Schumer co-authored a report warning that New York risked losing its
position as the world's financial capital to rivals such as London.
Tuesday, March 06, 2007
Mortality Derivatives
Mortality derivatives is an interesting subject, and the REcapitulator will be publishing a paper (more of a primer on the subject than delving into problems of conditional probability and mortality modeling) that will be available here. Some excerpts from the paper are given below.
The REcapitulator is also privy to information regarding the launch of Hurricane derivatives, but he doubts that these will catch on as there is major basis risk. The contracts (initiated by the CME) hedge against hurrican landfall (frequency), but not the severity of a given landfall. What is an insurance company to do if the severity of a hurricane is not a price factor? This initial attempt will hopefully spawn new innovation.
Anyway, some excerpts from the opening comments of the forthcoming paper:
The exposure of pension and insurance companies to unexpected decreases in mortality is an important risk, and one that has been increasingly difficult to predict. Actuarial assumptions regarding populations do not take into account secualar increases in life spans. To the extent that this risk can be transferred to the capital markets, it would create a more definable and predictable set of cash flows (and potentially reducing the cost of capital) for insurance and pension concerns.
While insurance companies can internally hedge their exposure to long-tail life insurance contracts through the writing of annuities, this presupposes the ability to sell annuities, a more or less contsant distribution of population, (assuming further that annuity purchasers do not buy life insurance products) and introduces other forms of risk to the overall insurance profile such as interest rate risk.
Mortality Derivatives may also be a more efficient way to price life and annuity contracts. Derivatives markets attract sophisticated participants who may have access to better information and/or more predictive financial models. This phenomenon has not been lost on the Federal Reserve, which routinely scans deriviatives markets and their corresponding implied expectations of the future in order to make policy decisions. This “tail wagging the dog” effect, due in large part to increased leverage than cash markets,could also provide valuable informational flow with regards to pricing the primary obligations of pension and insurance companies. These firms would have a competitive advantage versus their peers with mere active partcipation into the mortality derivatives markets. Information garnered in this fashion could be used for capital allocation and internal hedging purposes, in addition to providing a competitive advantage to firms participating in the mortality derivatives markets by acting as the proverbial “canary in the mineshaft” in detecting unexpected events that effect mortality rates.
The REcapitulator is also privy to information regarding the launch of Hurricane derivatives, but he doubts that these will catch on as there is major basis risk. The contracts (initiated by the CME) hedge against hurrican landfall (frequency), but not the severity of a given landfall. What is an insurance company to do if the severity of a hurricane is not a price factor? This initial attempt will hopefully spawn new innovation.
Anyway, some excerpts from the opening comments of the forthcoming paper:
The exposure of pension and insurance companies to unexpected decreases in mortality is an important risk, and one that has been increasingly difficult to predict. Actuarial assumptions regarding populations do not take into account secualar increases in life spans. To the extent that this risk can be transferred to the capital markets, it would create a more definable and predictable set of cash flows (and potentially reducing the cost of capital) for insurance and pension concerns.
While insurance companies can internally hedge their exposure to long-tail life insurance contracts through the writing of annuities, this presupposes the ability to sell annuities, a more or less contsant distribution of population, (assuming further that annuity purchasers do not buy life insurance products) and introduces other forms of risk to the overall insurance profile such as interest rate risk.
Mortality Derivatives may also be a more efficient way to price life and annuity contracts. Derivatives markets attract sophisticated participants who may have access to better information and/or more predictive financial models. This phenomenon has not been lost on the Federal Reserve, which routinely scans deriviatives markets and their corresponding implied expectations of the future in order to make policy decisions. This “tail wagging the dog” effect, due in large part to increased leverage than cash markets,could also provide valuable informational flow with regards to pricing the primary obligations of pension and insurance companies. These firms would have a competitive advantage versus their peers with mere active partcipation into the mortality derivatives markets. Information garnered in this fashion could be used for capital allocation and internal hedging purposes, in addition to providing a competitive advantage to firms participating in the mortality derivatives markets by acting as the proverbial “canary in the mineshaft” in detecting unexpected events that effect mortality rates.
Saturday, March 03, 2007
Right and wrong...
But never "correct" (in the epistemological sense of the term), the REcapitulator is looking back on the last week. Red is everywhere on financial data websites.
Volatility has indeed spiked over (in VIX terms) 20. I was wrong about the short-term prospects for the dollar/Yen, as everyone has blamed the yen carry trade for contributing to the decline.
And what a decline it was. The S&P declined from 1458 to 1398 in a matter of 4 days. Analysts at major banks (of course) bleat on about the "fundamentals" being "positive" and such. How would they know? Do the fundamentals change when massive selling causes inflation, stagflation, or deflation? The Recapitulator reminds his audience that the accuracy of forecasts by bank analysts is no better than random. Their compensation structure is entirely based on how convincing their forecasts are, not upon ex ante or ex post accountability.
So risk spreads are beginning to loosen. Other risks are also coming to fore. Insider trading is one such risk. Not everyone will be caught, but it will have a chilling effect on the more "aggressive" trades. Legal risk, like volatility in the markets, tends to cluster. Recall the flurry of activity Spitzer inititated in the early part of this century. (This is not unlike many revolutions. The new government presents offending parties to the
gallows. The public enjoys an emotional catharsis, which is short-lived. The now established
government then proceeds to do precisely what the old "evil" government did.)
So risk is increasing everywhere. Not as serene an environment as those bank "equity strategists" would have you believe.
Volatility has indeed spiked over (in VIX terms) 20. I was wrong about the short-term prospects for the dollar/Yen, as everyone has blamed the yen carry trade for contributing to the decline.
And what a decline it was. The S&P declined from 1458 to 1398 in a matter of 4 days. Analysts at major banks (of course) bleat on about the "fundamentals" being "positive" and such. How would they know? Do the fundamentals change when massive selling causes inflation, stagflation, or deflation? The Recapitulator reminds his audience that the accuracy of forecasts by bank analysts is no better than random. Their compensation structure is entirely based on how convincing their forecasts are, not upon ex ante or ex post accountability.
So risk spreads are beginning to loosen. Other risks are also coming to fore. Insider trading is one such risk. Not everyone will be caught, but it will have a chilling effect on the more "aggressive" trades. Legal risk, like volatility in the markets, tends to cluster. Recall the flurry of activity Spitzer inititated in the early part of this century. (This is not unlike many revolutions. The new government presents offending parties to the
gallows. The public enjoys an emotional catharsis, which is short-lived. The now established
government then proceeds to do precisely what the old "evil" government did.)
So risk is increasing everywhere. Not as serene an environment as those bank "equity strategists" would have you believe.
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
More "shocking" allegations of insider trading.
How many times must one comment on what is actually happening at 90% of the "Event Driven" hedge funds in NYC? Why are they all clustered there, or a short drive away in Conneticutt?
http://snipurl.com/1bi61
"Top News February 26, 2007, 3:03PM EST
Charges Pending in UBS Payoff Case
Sources say at least one analyst at the investment firm may face charges of
selling information on ratings changes before they're made public
Here's proof some still see value in brokerage-produced stock research, even
after the research scandal of four years ago tarnished the image of Wall Street
analysts. BusinessWeek has learned federal authorities are on the verge of
busting a scheme in which at least one employee of UBS was allegedly selling
information about upcoming changes in analyst ratings on stocks to traders not
affiliated with the Swiss investment firm."
http://snipurl.com/1bi61
"Top News February 26, 2007, 3:03PM EST
Charges Pending in UBS Payoff Case
Sources say at least one analyst at the investment firm may face charges of
selling information on ratings changes before they're made public
Here's proof some still see value in brokerage-produced stock research, even
after the research scandal of four years ago tarnished the image of Wall Street
analysts. BusinessWeek has learned federal authorities are on the verge of
busting a scheme in which at least one employee of UBS was allegedly selling
information about upcoming changes in analyst ratings on stocks to traders not
affiliated with the Swiss investment firm."
Volatility
The February volatility has surfaced, but the VIX, while up nearly 18%, has not spiked as per my comments. It is interesting to see China described as the "catalyst" for this set of circumstances. The REcaptitulator believes China is again experimenting to see just how the partial differential equation describing the sensitivity of U.S. markets to Chinese markets works. This is a dangerous game of "chicken", and I am not sure who will blink.
Whether this redefines the nature of risk premiums in today's compressed world remains to be seen.
Whether this redefines the nature of risk premiums in today's compressed world remains to be seen.
Monday, February 19, 2007
February
This is an interesting time. Volatility is historically low, and the oft-mentioned "longest time prior to a 2% decline", while flawed in the sense that structural changes in the financial sector have changed (together with Bernanke's "Great Moderation"), still looms...and that is without the Recapitulator thinking about wether or not returns are independent data points or path dependent and autocorrelated.
We are either heading for a decline or this is the largest head-fake I have ever seen in the financial markets.
We are either heading for a decline or this is the largest head-fake I have ever seen in the financial markets.
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